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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the economic impact of the government's proposed new UK R&D tax 
credit.  We measure the benefit of the credit by the effect on value added in the short and 
long_run.  This is simulated from existing econometric estimates o f the tax_price elasticity of 
R&D and the effect of R&D on productivity.  For the latter we allow R&D to have an effect 
on technology transfer (catching up with the technological frontier) as well as innovation 
(pushing the frontier forward).  We then compare the increase in value added to the likely 
exchequor costs of the program under a number of scenarios.  In the long run the increase in 
GDP far outweighs the costs of the tax credit.  The short run effect is far smaller with value-
added only exceeding cost if R&D grows at or below the rate of inflation. 
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September 2000 1 Introduction
R&D tax credits are again on the policy agenda. In his March 2001 Budget the Chancellor
announced his intention to extend the R&D tax credit for small and medium sized enter-
prises to larger ﬁrms in the following budget and issued a consultative document on how
it should be implemented. In this paper we consider what impact such a policy is likely to
have on UK productivity and growth.
One of the main justiﬁcations for government subsidies to R&D is the belief that social
rates of return are in excess of private rates of return. Firms’ decisions to undertake R&D
are based on their private return to R&D. These are generally thought to be lower than the
return to society as a whole. This means that we have under-investment in R&D. In order
to achieve the optimal level of R&D investment government policy should aim to bring
private incentives in line with the social rate of return.
The main reason why the social rate of return is believed to be higher than the private
return is because the knowledge generated from R&D “spills over” from the inventor to
other ﬁrms.1 Once invented an idea can be imitated by others (it is non-rivalrous and only
partially excludable), although intellectual property protection and delays in the dissemi-
nation of new ideas enable the innovator to appropriate a share of the rents from a new
idea. Knowledge is also ‘tacit’ in nature: it takes time and eﬀort to explain new ideas to
others and to codify inventions in manuals and textbooks.2 This means that imitation is not
costless and R&D activity may be important for understanding the discoveries of others.
Mansﬁeld et al. (1981) present evidence of substantial costs of imitation (on average, 65%
of innovation costs), while the average length of time for imitation is found to be 70% of
1Note that the ‘social rate of return’ to R&D in this literature refers to the private rate of return plus
any externalities.
2For informal discussions of the tacit nature of knowledge, see David (1992) and Rosenberg (1982).
2that taken for innovation. Recent theoretical research has emphasized the idea that R&D
not only leads to innovation, but also enhances one’s ability to imitate.3 This second role
is often termed the ‘second face of R&D.’ Empirical evidence lends support to these ideas.
In this paper we consider the implications of the two faces of R&D for the analysis of
public policies that seek to stimulate private-sector R&D activity. The policy we consider
is an R&D tax credit of the form set out in the Treasury’s 2001 Consultative Document.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the idea that R&D plays a dual
role in both innovation and imitation in a simple analytical framework. Section 3 looks
at the impact and cost eﬀectiveness of introducing an R&D tax credit in the UK. We do
this in several stages - (1) estimating the fall in the user cost of R&D for a typical ﬁrm,
(2) using the change in the user cost to estimate the change in R&D, (3) estimating the
impact of the change in R&D on TFP, (4) examining the exchequer cost of the policy. The
appendix provides a more technical description of the model and approach. A ﬁnal section
summarises and oﬀers some concluding remarks. Unsurprisingly we ﬁnd that in the short
run the exchequer costs will probably outweigh the increase in GDP. More interestingly,
we ﬁnd that the long-run eﬀect on GDP easily outweighs the likely costs under a range of
scenarios.
2 An Analytical Framework: The Two Faces of R&D
A large empirical literature has sought to estimate the rate of return to R&D. In general
the empirical literature ﬁnds the social rates of return to R&D substantially above private
rates of return. These ﬁndings are summarised by Griliches (1992), “In spite of (many)
diﬃculties, there has been a signiﬁcant number of reasonably well-done studies, all pointing
3See, for example, Aghion and Howitt (1998), Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Grossman and Helpman
(1991), Neary and Leahy (1999), and Segerstrom (1991).
3in the same direction: R&D spillovers are present, their magnitude may be quite large, and
social rates of return remain signiﬁcantly above private rates.”
The private rate of return can be estimated by looking at the impact of a ﬁrm’s own
R&D on the ﬁrm’s output. Estimates of the private rate of return to R&D are obtained
using US ﬁrm level data in Griliches (1992). The estimated elasticity of output with respect
to R&D is around 0.07. This says that for a 10% increase in R&D expenditure there will be
a bit less than a 1% increase in output (0.7%) holding other factors constant. The elasticity
of output with respect to R&D is related to the rate of return to R&D as
elasticity of output with respect to R&D = (rate of return to R&D)*(R&D stock/output).
The R&D stock to output ratio in the US was estimated to be around 26%. This implies a
rate of return of around 27% (=.07/.26) for R&D. Hall (1996) summarises empirical work
in this area and reports that estimates of private rates of return to R&D cluster around
10% to 15% though can be as high as 30% in some studies.
What about estimates of the social rate of return to R&D? Care must be taken in
interpreting estimates of the social rate of return to R&D. Ideas can spill over between ﬁrms
in the same industry, across industries and across countries. Production function estimates
using ﬁrm level data, where R&D in other ﬁrms is included in the regression, attempt to
capture the social rate of return to ﬁrms’ R&D (often within the industry).4 Regressions
of industry level productivity against industry-level R&D seek to capture the social rate of
return to the industry, but not spillovers to other industries (unless other industry R&D
has been incorporated in some way). Similarly, production function estimates conducted
at the national level capture within country spillovers, but not those between countries.
4The critical problem here is in constructing the ”knowledge weighting matrix” that links the R&D
conducted by one ﬁrm to the productivity of the recipient ﬁrms. Using information contained in patent
technology classes has proven relatively successful here (see Jaﬀe, 1986, for an early example or Bransetter,
1996, for a more recent case).
4In addition, an important part of innovative output is the introduction of new goods and
there are considerable diﬃculties that arise in measuring the value and beneﬁt of these new
goods.5
Cameron (1996a) and Jones and Williams (1998) summarize existing empirical estimates
of R&D’s social rate of return to R&D from the empirical literature on R&D and productiv-
ity. Many studies have been undertaken using US data and are typically for manufacturing
industries. Estimates of the social rate of return to own-industry R&D include 21%-76% in
Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984b), 24%-73% in Schankerman (1981), and 29-43% in Scherer
(1982), (1984). Once we take into account that R&D conducted in one industry may have
an impact on productivity in other industries (e.g. downstream industries), the estimated
social rate of return to R&D rises further and can be as high as 100%. Jones and Williams
(1998) show how estimates of R&D’s social rate of return from industry-level data can be
incorporated into a macroeconomic model of endogenous innovation and growth. They ﬁnd
that estimates actually provide a lower bound to R&D’s true social rate of return once one
takes into account the dynamic general equilibrium eﬀects emphasized in the endogenous
growth literature.
Another way in which the existing industry-level literature may underestimate both
the private and social rate of return to R&D is by assuming that imitation is costless.
Knowledge is ‘tacit’ in nature: it takes time and eﬀort to explain new ideas to others and to
codify inventions in manuals and textbooks. This means that imitation can itself be costly.
Recent work has emphasized the fact that R&D not only leads to innovation, but also
enhances one’s ability to imitate. Many of the beneﬁts to this second role of R&D activity
may be internalised by ﬁrms, and the externalities from R&D-based imitation might in
5There are a large number of other caveats to the approach of aggregating to capture externalities. These
are discussed in some detail in various chapters of Griliches (1998).
5themselves be less than those from innovation. However, in a world where imitation is no
longer costless, the knowledge spillovers emphasized in the innovation literature are now
dependent on other ﬁrms undertaking R&D activity.
Griﬃth, Redding and Van Reenen (2000) present an empirical framework in which
innovation and technology transfer provide two potential sources of productivity growth
for countries behind the technological frontier. The rate of return to R&D is composed of
an eﬀect on productivity through innovation and an eﬀect through increased potential for
imitation. A country’s distance from the technological frontier is used as a direct measure
of the potential for technology transfer, where the frontier is deﬁned for each industry as
the country with the highest level of total factor productivity (TFP).6
More formally, we assume that value-added, Y , is produced with a standard neoclassical
production technology,
Yit = AitF(Kit,L it) (1)
where i indexes countries, and t denotes time. A is an index of technical eﬃciency or TFP,
L corresponds to labour input, and K denotes physical capital. The endogenous growth and
empirical productivity literatures emphasize R&D-based innovation. Here, Ait is a function







+ γXit−1 + uit (2)
where ρ = dY/dG i st h es o c i a lr a t eo fr e t u r nt oR & D ,Xit−1 is a vector of control variables
and uit is an error term capturing stochastic determinants of TFP growth.8 The arguments
6See Cameron (1996b) for an analysis along these lines of Japan and the United States and Cameron,
Proudman, and Redding (1998) for an analysis of the United Kingdom and United States.
7See, in particular, Griliches (1980) and Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984a). The microeconomic rationale
for this relationship is provided by the endogenous growth literature. See, for example, Aghion and Howitt
(1992, 1998).
8There is a debate in the endogenous growth literature about whether the level of R&D activity can have
6above suggest that the conventional speciﬁcation needs to be augmented in order to allow
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(3)
Technology transfer is made up of two components. The presence of the ﬁrst component,
β4lnAFt, allows the contemporaneous rate of TFP growth in the frontier to have a di-
rect eﬀect on TFP growth in non-frontier countries. The second of these components,
δ1 ln(Ai/AF), allows for autonomous technology transfer independent of R&D activity. For




is negative; the more negative relative
TFP, the further a country lies behind the frontier, and the greater the potential for tech-
nology transfer. Therefore, with technology transfer, the estimated coeﬃcient on relative
TFP (δ1) should be negative.
Absorptive capacity is captured by an interaction term that captures the second face of
R&D. The more negative relative TFP, the further a country lies behind the frontier, and
the greater the potential for R&D-based technology transfer. Therefore, if there is a second
face of R&D, the estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction term (δ2) should be negative.
In steady-state equilibrium, TFP in a country i will grow at the same constant rate,
equal to TFP growth in the frontier (4lnAi = 4lnAF for all i). The frontier will be
whichever of the countries has the highest rate of TFP growth from innovation alone. All
other countries will lie an equilibrium distance behind the constantly advancing frontier
permanent eﬀects on the rate of growth of output (the ‘scale eﬀects’ debate as in Jones (1995a), (1995b)).
The conventional speciﬁcation above exhibits such a scale eﬀect, although it is straightforward to eliminate
it by introducing diminishing returns to R&D.
7such that TFP growth from innovation and technology transfer in a non-frontier country
exactly equals TFP growth from innovation alone in the frontier.
The sum of the estimated coeﬃcients on the R&D intensity in equation (3) is R&D’s
full social rate of return for an industry (ρ ≡ ρ1 − δ2.ln(Ai/AF)it−1) and depends on both
innovation and technology transfer. Our estimate of the social rate of return to R&D from
innovation (ρ1) is about 40%, which is broadly comparable with existing estimates of R&D’s
social rate of return using industry-level data. The existing estimates are largely for the
United States, which is typically the frontier in our dataset. The rate of return to R&D in
the US should therefore largely consist of a rate of return to innovation.
The full social rate of return to R&D depends upon how far a country lies behind
the technological frontier. Griﬃth, Redding, and Van Reenen (2000) present empirical
estimates. The relative level of TFP in the UK relative to the US in total manufacturing
over the period 1974-90 was around 62.6%. The implied social rate of return to R&D (from
both innovation and absorptive capacity) is around 90%. The social rate of return to R&D
in the US is indeed due almost entirely to innovation (a total rate of return of 0.439 compare
ar a t eo fr e t u r nf r o mi n n o v a t i o no f0.433).
One important conclusion from the analysis in that paper is that many existing studies,
in so far as they are based on US data (a country which is typically the frontier), will tend
to underestimate the social rate of return to R&D. In non-frontier countries, there is the
potential for R&D to generate TFP growth from both innovation and technology transfer.
This conclusion receives independent support from Eaton et al. (1998), who calibrate a
computable general equilibrium model of endogenous innovation and growth to economy-
wide data from 21 OECD countries. With the exception of Portugal, research productivity
in all other OECD countries is found to be higher than in the U.S.
8This raises the question why many non-frontier countries do not undertake more R&D.
One answer may be that there are larger diﬀerences between private and social rates of
return in these countries. If some of the technology transfer induced by R&D activity
takes the form of an externality it will not be internalised by private sector agents. The
explanation provided by Eaton et al. (1998) is that research incentives are lower due to
smaller market size. Market failures such as underdevelopment of ﬁnancial markets and
government policies may also act as barriers to R&D investment.
As e c o n dc o n c l u s i o ni st h a tad i s t i n c t i o nn e e d st ob ed r a w nb e t w e e nt h es o c i a lr a t eo f
return to R&D at the national and supra-national levels. In the theoretical model presented
above, an increase in R&D in the frontier raises the steady-state rate of TFP growth in all
other countries. In steady-state, TFP in all countries grows at the same rate, equal to TFP
growth in the frontier. Thus, although national social rates of return to R&D are higher in
non-frontier countries, there is an important supra-national externality to R&D undertaken
in the frontier.
3P o l i c y A n a l y s i s
One of the policy implications of ﬁnding social rates of return in excess of private is that
it would be welfare-improving to stimulate more R&D in the private sector. How should a
policy-maker seek to do this? Tax incentives seem a natural policy tool for a market-oriented
government wanting to increase R&D expenditures. Firms decide where and how to spend
their R&D rather than have it determined through a bureaucratic central authority. The
policy instrument is targeted closely at the source of the market failure. Many countries
have turned to ﬁscal incentives for R&D, often involving substantial sums of taxpayers’
9money.9
What impact would we expect the introduction of an R&D tax credit in the UK to
have?
We consider the impact that an incremental R&D tax credit would have on UK TFP
growth and value-added in the context of the model laid out above. Our estimates relate
to UK manufacturing only, but as this represents around 80% of UK R&D this should give
a fairly complete picture. In order to answer the question of how cost eﬀective a tax credit
would be we need to specify:
• how the tax credit will change the price (user cost) of R&D;
• how R&D expenditure will respond to a change in its price;
• how TFP will respond to a change in R&D expenditure;
• how manufacturing value-added will respond to a change in TFP;
• how much the tax credit will cost the Inland Revenue.
We draw on estimates from our econometric work to provide answers to the ﬁrst four
of these questions. The ﬁfth, on revenue costs, we estimated from aggregate data. In order
to answer the question of whether an R&D tax credit is cost-eﬀective, we need to estimate
how much it will cost the Inland Revenue. Note that this is not the same as evaluating
whether the policy is welfare improving. We do not consider potential deadweight welfare
costs from any distortionary taxation used to ﬁnance the R&D tax credit. We also do not
consider the opportunity cost of the funds allocated to the R&D tax credit, which could
be spent on other areas of government expenditure. However, a necessary (though not
9See, for example, the discussions in Griﬃth, Sandler and Van Reenen (1995), Gravelle (1999), Hall
(1993), Klette, Moen and Griliches (1999), Mansﬁeld (1986), and US Government (1989).
10suﬃcient) condition for the tax credit to be welfare improving is that the social surplus it
generates is greater than the direct monetary cost. Moreover, a comparison of the increase
in value-added as a result of the policy with its monetary cost constitutes an important
part of a wider welfare evaluation.
We estimate what will be the immediate impact, and what the eﬀects will be in the
long-run. This is an important distinction as there are signiﬁcant adjustment lags between
a change in the user cost and R&D expenditure and the change in R&D and the subsequent
increase in GDP. The details of how we do our calculations are sketched out here. A technical
appendix provides the gory detail. While our analysis accounts for many features of R&D
tax credit design and the ways in which ﬁrms are likely to respond to the introduction of a
tax credit, there are a number of assumptions that we make in the interests of tractability. In
particular, we assume that the accumulation of physical and human capital are unaﬀected
by the tax credit; we do not consider the welfare costs that may arise from additional
distortionary taxation used to ﬁnance the tax credit; we also do not consider the returns to
alternative possible uses of the funds allocated to the tax credit.
3.1 T h eI m p a c to fa nR & DT a xC r e d i to nt h eP r i c eo fR & D
The impact that an R&D tax credit has on the price of R&D depends on the precise details
of its design. We consider a credit that is designed as proposed in the 2001 Consultative
Document. The main features of this are that it is an incremental credit on a two-year
rolling average base, the base is indexed by inﬂation and the credit is implemented as a
deduction to corporate tax at a 50% rate.10
10The consultative document also proposes many other details, one important one is using a credit bank
whereby ﬁrms carry forward a “shadow” negative credit. The impact of this is not considered here as it does
not aﬀect the user cost in our model ﬁrm. However, it would greatly aﬀect the dispersion of marginal rates
faced by diﬀerent ﬁrms. See Bloom, Griﬃth and Klemm (2001).
11We use estimates of the user cost of R&D and the own price elasticity of R&D from
Bloom, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (2001)a n dB l o o m ,G r i ﬃth and Klemm (2001). We assume
that only R&D performed in the UK is eligible for the tax credit. The impact of the credit
on the price of R&D is measured by comparing the user cost of R&D in the absence of the
credit with the user cost including the credit (see Appendix). The value of the tax credit to
a ﬁrm receiving it depends upon the time path of the ﬁrm’s R&D expenditure. We calculate
the user cost for a ‘model ﬁrm’ where R&D is always expected to increase by at least the
rate of inﬂation and where the ﬁrm is never in a tax exhausted position.11 We assume that
the real interest rate (and also the ﬁrm’s discount rate) is 10% and that inﬂation is 5%.
The user cost combines a measure of the net present value of the tax credit with infor-
mation about other features of the tax system to tell us about how the tax credit changes
the price of investing an additional pound of R&D. The proposed tax credit yields a change
in the user cost of 1.9% (i.e. the user cost of R&D capital has declined from about 0.386
to 0.379). The ﬁgure of 1.9% is considerably lower than the statutory rate of 50%. This is
for a number of reasons. The three main features eﬀecting the user cost are:
• it is implemented as a deduction, this means that the equivalent rate as a tax credit is
15%, (the statutory tax rate is 30%, so the value of a 50% deduction is 30%*50%=15%).
• the tax credit is paid on incremental R&D, with the increment deﬁn e dw i t hr e s p e c t
to a 2-year rolling average base. This means that the ﬁrm receives a credit on the
additional R&D it does over the average of the past two years. When a ﬁrm does
more R&D in one year this earns them a credit in that year, but it also reduces the
value of the credit to them in the next year by increasing their base.
11These are reasonable assumptions for many large ﬁrms. Bloom, Griﬃth and Klemm (2001)u s ed a t ao n
as a m p l eo f138 UK quoted ﬁrms to obtain estimates of the impact the various credits will have on the price
of ﬁrms’ R&D and thus look at heterogeneity in user costs across ﬁrms.
12• the credit is paid on the increase in real R&D, that is the base is indexed by inﬂation,
the 2001 Consultative Document proposes using the Retail Price Index (RPI).
Although a fall of under 2% seems small, it is relatively large by Britain’s historical
standards. The tax component of the R&D user cost in the UK has varied by only 0.1
percentage points between any two years from 1979 to 1997.
3.2 The Response of R&D Expenditure to a Change in its Price
We use estimates of how R&D expenditure will respond to changes in its tax price from
Bloom, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (2001).12 The results in that paper suggest that the own
price impact elasticity is around 0.12 and the long-run elasticity is around 0.86. This means
that a 10% change in the price of R&D will lead to an immediate increase of 1.2% in R&D
intensity and a 8.6% increase in the long run (see Appendix for details). In order to estimate
the amount of new R&D that is done in response to a change in the tax price we assume
that the cost of capital calculated above gives a good approximation of the average cost of
capital faced by ﬁrms.
Table 1 shows the change in the user cost and our estimates of the resulting change in
R&D intensity. The immediate or impact eﬀect is to increase the R&D intensity by 0.23%,
and the long-run eﬀect is 1.6%. To gives some idea of the size of this change, over the
period 1973 to 1997 the annualised growth rate in the R&D intensity was 1.0% (there is
considerable annual variation from -7% to 16%). The impact of reducing the user cost of
R&D by 1.9% would thus increase the growth rate by around a quarter of its usually annual
growth rate. This is quite a large eﬀect.
12See Hall and Van Reenen (1999) for a survey of the empirical evidence on the eﬀectiveness of R&D tax
credits.
13Table 1: Impact of the R&D tax credit on the price and amount of R&D
Change in user cost of R&D -1.9% (from 0.386 to 0.379)
Increase in R&D intensity, %∆R/Y
impact 0.23%
long-run 1.6%
Initial Level of R&D intensity (without tax credit) 5.7%
Implied R&D intensity with tax credit:
impact 5.713%
long-run 5.791%
Notes: %∆(R/Y )=l o g ( R/Y )t − log(R/Y )0, where t is period under consideration
and 0 denotes the base period. See Appendices A1 and A2 for details
3.3 The Response of TFP and Value-added to a Change in R&D Intensity
First, we analyse the eﬀects of the tax credit when R&D only aﬀects innovation. This is
a special case of the model above, where R&D has no eﬀect on the propensity to imitate
(in the context of equation (3) this means δ2 =0 ). This corresponds to the conventional
speciﬁcation with ‘one face’ of R&D and provides a useful benchmark for our results. In this
case, total manufacturing TFP growth is given by equation (2), and the increase in R&D
intensity following the tax credit raises TFP growth in both the short and long-run. The
estimated R&D innovation coeﬃcient in Griﬃth, Redding, and Van Reenen (2000) is 0.433.
T h ep e r c e n t a g ei n c r e a s ei nT F Pg r o w t hf o l l o w i n gt h et a xc r e d i ti st h e r e f o r e0 . 4 3 3t i m e st h e
original level of the R&D intensity times the percentage increase in R&D intensity due to
the tax credit. That is, an eﬀect of 0.433 × 0.057 = 0.025 times the percentage increase
in R&D intensity (see Appendix), where the short and long-run values for the latter are
e v a l u a t e di nT a b l e1 above.
Second, in line with recent empirical evidence, we allow for R&D to aﬀect both innova-
tion and imitation. This is the general case where there are ‘two faces’ of R&D and δ2 6=0 .
14In this case, total manufacturing TFP growth is given by equation (3). The implications of
the tax credit for TFP growth are now diﬀerent between the short-run and the long-run or
steady-state. In the short-run, the increase in the R&D intensity following the tax credit
raises TFP growth through both rates of innovation and imitation. In the long-run, assum-
ing that the tax credit does not result in a change in technological leadership, the increase
in the R&D intensity can have no eﬀect on UK TFP growth. In steady-state, UK TFP
growth from both innovation and imitation must equal the (unchanged) rate of TFP growth
in the frontier from innovation alone. Since the increase in the R&D intensity following the
tax credit raises both innovation and imitation for a given size of the technological gap,
something must adjust in order for this steady-state equilibrium condition to hold. The
variable that adjusts is the size of the technological gap: higher levels of UK TFP relative
to the frontier imply a smaller potential for imitation. The adjustment process is as follows.
The short-run increase in TFP growth following the introduction of the tax credit results
in a progressively higher level of relative TFP which reduces the potential for imitation
until TFP growth in the UK from innovation and imitation again equals TFP growth in the
frontier from innovation alone. The steady-state eﬀect of the R&D tax credit is to lead to
a higher steady-state level of relative TFP. Note that steady-state TFP growth will always
be higher in a model where R&D promotes imitation as well as innovation: TFP growth
in the UK is no longer constrained by domestic rates of innovation, but can beneﬁt from
spillovers from a more rapid rate of innovation in the frontier.
With two faces of R&D, the short-run eﬀect of the increase in the R&D intensity due
to the tax credit depends on the initial level of relative TFP. The further a country initially
lies behind the technological frontier, the greater the potential for R&D-based imitation.
For our main estimates we use a value of 0.85 for the UK; this says that TFP levels in
15the UK are initially 85% of what they are in the US. We consider how the eﬀects of the
R&D tax credit changes with diﬀerent sizes of this productivity gap. As shown in Table
2, these values imply that the short-run percentage change in TFP growth following the
introduction of the tax credit is 3.4% of the percentage increase in R&D (see Appendix).
When we consider only the direct impact of R&D (the ﬁr s tr o w )t h ei m m e d i a t ei m p a c to f
the R&D tax credit is to increase the growth rate of TFP by 0.0056%, and in the long-run
by about a third of a percent. Once we take into account the second face of R&D the
immediate impact increases to 0.0077%. Thus, the short-run eﬀect on rates of TFP growth
when we consider the two faces of R&D (innovation and imitation) is about a third again
as much as when R&D only aﬀects innovation. In the ﬁnal row we show how the increase
in the TFP growth rate varies with the relative TFP gap. If we assume an initial gap of
7 5 %t h e nt h ei n c r e a s ei nt h eg r o w t hr a t ei sh i g h e ra t0 . 0 0 9 3 % .
T a b l e2 :P e r c e n t a g ei n c r e a s ei nT F Pg r o w t h ,4lnAC
it − 4lnAit
impact long-run
Innovation eﬀect 0.0056% 0.32%
Innovation and imitation eﬀect 0.0077% -
(UK TFP initially 85% of frontier)
Innovation and imitation eﬀect 0.0093% -
(UK TFP initially 75% of frontier)
In the Appendix, we show how the model presented above may be solved for the eﬀect of
the R&D tax credit on steady-state levels of relative TFP when there are two faces of R&D.
This steady-state eﬀect is independent of the initial level of relative TFP. Our estimates also
d e p e n do nt h er a t eo fT F Pg r o w t hi nt h eU S( w h i c hi st h ef r o n t i e rc o u n t r y ) .W eu s eav a l u e
of 1.5%, which is the average rate of growth over the past two decades. We also consider
16how sensitive the estimates are to using alternative values. Table 3 presents the implied
eﬀect of the tax credit on steady-state equilibrium levels of relative TFP. Since this refers
to an eﬀect on levels of relative TFP, while Table 2 was concerned with rates of growth, it
is hard to directly compare these numbers. We show below how both sets of ﬁgures may be
made comparable by examining the implied increase in manufacturing value-added.
Table 3: Percentage increase in relative TFP in long-run steady state
ln(AC
it/AFt) − ln(Ait/AFt)
Innovation and Imitation eﬀect 0.43%
(UK TFP initially 85% of frontier)
To do so, we employ a standard growth accounting decomposition which suggests that
t h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fo u t p u te q u a l sT F Pg r o w t hp l u st h ew e i g h t e dg r o w t ho ff a c t o ri n p u t s
(see Appendix). The eﬀect of the R&D tax credit on manufacturing value-added in the year
after it is introduced is simply the short-run increase in TFP growth from Table 2 times the
initial level of manufacturing value-added. This is shown in the column headed “impact”
in Table 4 for the one face of R&D and two faces of R&D models using manufacturing
value-added in 19 9 9( u s i n gt h e1999 value for manufacturing value-added of £155bn as the
initial value). When R&D only aﬀects innovation (the one face model), the long-run eﬀect
of the tax credit is a permanently higher rate of TFP growth in each subsequent year. As
shown in the Appendix, this may be converted into an eﬀect on manufacturing value-added
in any given year by multiplying the annual increase in TFP growth by the initial level
of manufacturing value-added at the beginning of that year. The ﬁnal column of Table 4
reports the implied eﬀect on manufacturing value-added in 1999. When R&D aﬀects both
innovation and imitation (the two faces model), the long-run eﬀect is a permanently higher
level of TFP relative to the frontier, where the frontier is constantly advancing at a rate
17greater than UK-based rates of innovation. Again as shown in the Appendix, this may be
converted into an eﬀect on manufacturing value-added in any given year by multiplying the
increase in steady-state levels of relative TFP growth by the initial level of manufacturing
value-added at the beginning of that year. The third column of Table 4 reports the implied
eﬀect on manufacturing value-added in 1999. The eﬀect is larger than in the one face
model, because R&D raises manufacturing value-added by enhancing both innovation and
imitation.
Table 4: Increase in manufacturing value-added, £m
impact long-run
Innovation eﬀect 8.7 491.9
Innovation and imitation eﬀect 11.9 670.1
3.4 The Cost Eﬀectiveness of an R&D Tax Credit
H o wm u c hi ss u c hap o l i c yl i k e l yt oc o s t ?I no r d e rt oa n s w e rt h i sq u e s t i o nw en e e dt ok n o w
w h a tt h er e a lg r o w t hr a t eo fR & Dw o u l db ei nt h ea b s e n c eo ft h et a xc r e d i t .S i n c ew ed o
not know this we calculate it for a range of real growth rates between 0% (R&D grows at
t h es a m er a t ea st h eR P I )t o5 % .O v e rt h ep e r i o d1973 to 1997 the annualised real growth
rate in R&D was 0.8%. It varied substantially year to year from -6.0% to 17%. In the last
ﬁve years it has been ranged from -1%( 1994-95) to 3.9% (1998-99). We thus consider the
likely counterfactual rate of growth to be towards the lower growth rates shown in the ﬁrst
few rows of the table.
The Inland Revenue (IR) has to pay 15% on every £ of incremental R&D. Incremental
R&D is deﬁned as the amount of R&D done today minus the average amount done in the
past two years, indexed for inﬂation. This means that, even if ﬁrms had not responded at
all to the credit the IR would have had to pay out 15% of the increase in real R&D. This
18means that the revenue cost depends mostly on the growth rate in R&D. Therefore, we
calculate estimates of the revenue cost for diﬀerent assumed growth rates. The ﬁrst column
in Table 5 shows the amount of R&D that would be deﬁned as incremental under the rules
of the proposed tax credit (under the assumption that the credit had no impact on R&D
spending). The second column shows the amount of credit the IR would have to pay out
on this R&D. This is one form of deadweight loss from such a credit.
The IR would also have to pay out a credit on new R&D that resulted from the credit.
Manufacturing business enterprise research and development (BERD) was £8,782m in 1999.
From the estimate of the impact eﬀect of the R&D tax credit in Table 1, this means that
the immediate eﬀect of the R&D tax credit will be to raise R&D spending by £19.9m which
will cost the IR £3m a year as shown in column (3). In column (4) we add this number to
the ﬁgure in column (2), which yields an estimate of the immediate revenue cost of the tax
credit, taking into account both the incremental growth in R&D that would have occurred
without the tax credit and new R&D due to the policy intervention. Combining the long-
run response of R&D to the tax credit from Table 1 with the 1999 ﬁgure for manufacturing
BERD above implies a long-run increase in R&D of £142.5m which will cost the IR £21.4m
per year. In column (5), we add this number to the ﬁgure in column (2) to get an estimate
of the long-run revenue cost of the credit. It should be noted that these revenue costs are
very approximate. They do not take into account any of the complexities of taxation at the
ﬁrm level.
19Table 5: Revenue cost in £m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real growth Incremental R&D Credit paid Credit paid Credit paid
rate in R&D without credit on incremental on incremental on incremental
(in the absence R&D without R&D with credit R&D with credit
of the credit) credit (from (2)) (impact eﬀect) (long-run eﬀect)
0% 0 0 3 21.4
1% 130 19.5 22.5 40.9
2% 257 38.5 41.5 60.0
3% 380 57.0 60.0 78.4
4% 500 75.0 78.0 96.4
5% 617 92.6 95.6 114
I nT a b l e6w ec a l c u l a t et h ec o s te ﬀectiveness of the proposed tax credit using the es-
timates of the increase in manufacturing value-added from Table 4 and the estimates of
revenue cost from Table 5. The cost eﬀectiveness is simply additional value-added divided
by revenue cost. In the ﬁrst two columns we use the increase in value-added implied by the
model of TFP where R&D only has a direct aﬀect through increasing the rate of innovation.
Here we see that only if R&D does not grow above the rate of inﬂation (in the absence of
the credit) is the tax credit cost eﬀective in the short-run. This is because with higher
growth rates the deadweight of the tax credit is greater. A similar picture arises looking at
the model in which R&D also contributes to TFP growth by enhancing imitation, although
the cost-eﬀectiveness ratios are higher.
In the long-run or steady state the credit is cost eﬀective which ever model or growth
rate we consider.
20Table 6: Cost eﬀectiveness
Real growth Innovation Innovation and Imitation
rate in R&D impact long-run impact long-run
(in the absence
of the credit)
0% 2.90 23.01 3.97 31.35
1%0 . 3 9 12.04 0.53 16.39
2% 0.21 8.22 0.29 11.19
3% 0.146 . 2 80.20 8.55
4% 0.11 5.10 0.156 . 9 5
5% 0.09 4.32 0.125 . 8 8
The upsurge in US productivity growth between 1995 and 2000 has stimulated a vigorous
debate over whether there has been a structural shift in the growth of TFP associated with
rapid computer-based technological change.13 Since the US is generally the technological
frontier, according to our model this will aﬀect the long-run TFP growth rate of the UK
economy (British TFP growth will also approach 2% p.a). What is more relevant to this
paper, however, is that the impact of the UK R&D tax credit will vary depending on our
assumptions regarding US TFP growth. In particular a faster TFP growth in the frontier
is associated with a higher equilibrium TFP gap between the UK and the US. In this
circumstance an extra pound of R&D is more valuable because it helps the UK to catch
up more quickly with the US (the second face of R&D-based technology transfer becomes
stronger).
Our baseline estimates assume that US TFP growth is 1.5%. If US TFP growth was
higher at 2% then this would mean a long-run increase in valued-added of £710m rather
than the £670.1m of Table 4. The two faces steady-state cost eﬀectiveness for 2% real
growth (for example) would be 11.8 (rather than 11.2 as shown in Table 5). If US TFP
growth was 2.5% the equivalent numbers are: £750m and 12.5. So, although there are
13See Van Reenen (2001) for a discussion on the hard evidence over the “new economy”.
21additional beneﬁt sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hR & Dp o l i c yi ft h e r eh a sb e e na ni n c r e a s ei nf r o n t i e r
steady state growth these are not huge.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In March 2001 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced his intention to extend an R&D
tax credit to large ﬁrms in his next budget. In this paper we have examined what is the
likely impact of this policy and whether it will be cost eﬀective. There is obviously a
large degree of uncertainty surrounding these calculations, but we think it is a valuable
exercise. Much progress has been made in recent years in examining the impact of ﬁscal
incentives on R&D and on analysing the eﬀect of R&D on growth. We use estimates from
recent econometric work to simulate the eﬀect of the proposed R&D policy based on the
design contained in the Treasury’s consultative document. Our model allows R&D to have
a dual impact through its increase in the rate of innovation and through its “second face”
of improving technology transfer. We ﬁnd that the short-run eﬀect of the R&D policy on
manufacturing value-added is very limited when we assume that in the absence of the R&D
tax credit the real rate of growth of R&D would be 1% or more). In this case the exchequer
cost is greater than the extra output generated in the ﬁrst year. This is due to the design
of the credit (it is not very generous), the slow adjustment of R&D to changes in its price
and the slow impact of R&D on long-run TFP. In the longer-run, however, the policy seems
f a rm o r ea t t r a c t i v ea n di sc o s t - e ﬀective under a wide range of assumptions.
There are a number of important limitations to the paper. First, we have assumed that
R&D is neutral with respect to other factors of production. Although this is a common
a s s u m p t i o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r ew ea r er a t h e ru n e a s yw i t hi ta st h e r ea r el i k e l yt ob ec o m -
22plementarities between R&D and physical and human capital.14 A more general analysis
would take these into account. A corollary of non-neutrality is that the demand for R&D
scientists is likely to rise as a result of the subsidy. To the extent that the labour supply
of these highly skilled workers is ﬁxed, much of the subsidy may be captured in the form
of higher wages, at least in the short run.15 In the longer-run labour supply will adapt but
even the small gains we identify in the shorter run may be illusory.
A second limitation of the study is our focus on manufacturing. This is necessary because
most of the existing estimates are based on data from this sector. Although it is true that
80% of R&D is conducted in manufacturing under 20% of people are actually employed
in this sector. Since we do not focus on inter-industry spillovers (such as those from the
manufacturing industries to the service industries) we may be underestimating the beneﬁts
of the R&D tax credit.
A third limitation is that we have not modelled the international dimension of R&D in
any detail. Although we do allow for technology transfer across counties within industries
we have not taken into account the eﬀect of UK policy on other countries. On the positive
side there are likely to be some spillovers from the UK to other nations (even in the terms
of our model the UK is frontier in some industries). On the negative side, some of the
additional UK R&D may come from multinationals simply relocating their R&D activity.16
This is clearly a concern of the EU and an R&D tax policy may eventually be blocked
because of these concerns over “state aid” rules.
Finally, and from a policy point of view the most problematic, is the issue of timing.
We have focused on the impact eﬀect and the long-run eﬀect. We have not modelled the
14See, inter alia, Machin and Van Reenen (1998).
15S e eG o o l s b e e( 1998) for evidence of this aﬀect in the US.
16See Bloom and Griﬃth (2001) for evidence on this.
23transition to steady state. This is due to the highly complex nature of the dynamics and
our uncertainty over the various adjustment processes. Yet for a Chancellor with his eye on
the electoral cycle the issue of exactly when the policy will become cost eﬀective and start
bridging the productivity gap is clearly important. We hope to address these concerns in
future work.
24Appendix
A Details of the Calculations
This appendix gives a technical explanation of our modelling strategy and calculations. Our
aim is to provide suﬃcient detail to allow the reader to reproduce our calculations making
alternative assumptions. Values used for key parameters are as follows:
Table A1 : Values of the Key Parameters
Real interest rate 10%
Statutory tax rate on corporate income 30%
Economic depreciation rate of R&D 28%
Manufacturing value-added £155bn
Manufacturing BERD £8,782m
R&D/Y in UK 0.057
R&D/Y in US 0.079
US TFP growth 1.5%
UK TFP relative to the US 85%
Net present value of existing depreciation allowances on R&D 28.7%
A.1 How Will an R&D Tax Credit Change the Price of R&D?
The standard methodology for measuring the impact of a tax credit on the price of invest-
ment is the user cost. This tells us what the impact of the tax credit would be on the price
of investing an additional pound in R&D. Let i index countries and t index years. The
impact of an R&D tax credit on the price of R&D can be summarised by a user cost of










[rit + δ] (4)
where Ac is the net present value of the tax credit, Ad is the net present value of tax
depreciation allowances, τ is the statutory tax rate on corporate income, r is the real interest
rate and δ is the economic depreciation rate. Bloom, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (2001) provide
estimates of this for the G7 countries plus Australia and Spain for the period 1979-1997.
The net present value of the credit, Ad, will depend on the precise design. The fact that
25the credit is on incremental expenditure means that, by tying the amount of credit given to
the past levels of spending, the value of the credit is reduced. This is because, by spending
an extra pound today the ﬁrm earns a credit today, but it also reduces the amount of credit
it will get in the future. In addition, the fact that the credit is implemented as a deduction
means that it is worth the credit rate, c, times the statutory rate, τ. The proposal is also















w h e r ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tR & Dg r o w sb ya tl e a s tt h er a t eo fi n ﬂa t i o ni ne v e r yy e a r ,c is
the nominal credit rate, π is the inﬂation rate, r is the ﬁrm’s discount rate (the real interest
rate) and k is the number of years over which the moving-average base is calculated.17 The
credit proposed in the 2001 Consultative document has a two year moving average base,
R & Dw i l lb ei n d e x e db yt h eR P Ia n di sp r o p o s e dt h a ti tw i l lb ei m p l e m e n t e da sad e d u c t i o n
a tt h er a t eo f5 0 % .T h i sm e a n st h a tt h er a t eo fc r e d i ti sc =0 .5∗0.3=0 .15,a n dw ea s s u m e
that inﬂation is 5% and the real interest rate is 10%. The net present value of the proposed
tax credit is thus
Ad
t =0 .15 ∗ [1 − 0.5 ∗ 0.955 − 0.5 ∗ 0.868] (6)
=0 .013 (7)
Using the other parameters set out in Table A.1 this gives a user cost without the tax credit
of
pit =
(1 − (0 + 0.287))
(1 − 0.3)
[0.1 +0 .2 8 ]=0 .386 (8)
a n dw i t ht h et a xc r e d i to f
pit =
(1 − (0.013+0 .287))
(1 − 0.3)
[0.1 +0 .2 8 ]=0 .379 (9)
which gives a change of 1.9% in the user cost of R&D as a result of the R&D tax credit.
17See Bloom, Griﬃth and Klemm (2001), Eisner et al (1984) and Hall (1993).
26A.2 How Will R&D Expenditure Respond to a Change in its Price?
An equation for the eﬀect of the price (generally measured as a user cost deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n













− φln(pit)+ηi + St + ωit (10)
where R is R&D, Y is value-added, η captures country speciﬁc characteristics and S captures
common macro shocks. Bloom, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (2001) estimate such a model using
data on a panel of countries and obtain estimates of θ =0 .86 and φ =0 .12 (see Bloom,
Griﬃth and Van Reenen (2001), Table I, Column 4).
Consider the eﬀect of a permanent R&D tax credit that reduces the user cost of capital
by z% in a non-frontier country. The instantaneous eﬀect on the R&D intensity is given by
4ln(R/Y )ij = φz%=0 .12z%. (11)
T h el o n g - r u np e r c e n t a g ec h a n g ei nt h eR & Di n t e n s i t yf o l l o w i n gt h ei n t r o d u c t i o no fa nR & D










Equations (8) and (9) suggest that the proposed tax credit will change the user cost by 1.9
percentage points. Plugging this in to equations (11)a n d( 12) yield predictions that the
R&D intensity will increase by 0.23% immediately and by 1.6% in the long-run.
A.3 How Will TFP Respond to a Change in R&D Expenditure?
We begin by analysing the eﬀects of the R&D tax credit when R&D only inﬂuences TFP
growth through the rate of innovation (i.e. there is no eﬀect on the ability to imitate). In
this case, total manufacturing TFP growth is given by the empirical version of equation (2)






+ ψi + Tt + εit (13)
where the tilde denotes that we only consider R&D’s eﬀect on innovation. ρ gives an
e s t i m a t eo ft h er a t eo fr e t u r no nR & D ,ψi is a ﬁxed eﬀect that controls for unobserved
27heterogeneity across countries in the determinants of TFP growth, Tt i sav e c t o ro ft i m e
dummies controlling for common macroeconomic shocks, and εit is a serially uncorrelated
error. Griﬃth, Redding and Van Reenen (2001) obtain an estimate of b ρ =0 .433.W e
also use the fact that in the UK, total manufacturing value-added in 1999 was £155bn
and Business Enterprise R&D Expenditure (BERD) was £8.78bn.18 This yields an R&D
intensity of 0.057. Plugging these into (13) yields
4ln e Ait =0 .025 + ψi + Tt + εit.
With a tax credit we have
4ln e AC




it × (1 +% ∆R/Y )+ψi + Tt + εit
=0 .025(1 +% ∆R/Y )+ψi + Tt + εit
where the superscript C indicates the adoption of the R&D tax credit, and %∆R/Y is the
increase in R&D intensity measured from (11)o r( 12). The implied change in TFP growth
following the tax credit is thus
4ln e AC
it − 4ln e Ait =0 .025(%∆R/Y ). (16)
From our calculations above we know that the impact eﬀect of the tax credit is to increase
R&D by 0.23% so this gives us an immediate increase in TFP growth of 0.0056%. Note
that, because the equation for TFP growth is linear (rather than log linear) in the R&D
intensity, the eﬀect of the R&D tax credit on TFP growth depends on the level of the R&D
intensity.
We now extend the analysis to allow R&D to also play a role in promoting imitation.

























18Manufacturing valued-added is from Table 15.4 of Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1999. Manufacturing
BERD is Table 5 in First Release 1999 and equals DLEP plus DLEX.
28The diﬀerence between these two is given by
4lnAC





















(1 +% ∆R/Y ). (18)
Griﬃth, Redding and Van Reenen (2001)e s t i m a t eb ρ1 =0 .433, b β =0 .124,b δ1 =0 .068,b δ2 =
1.00. W eu s et h es a m ei n i t i a lv a l u ef o rt h eR & Di n t e n s i t ya sa b o v e . T h ei n c r e a s ei nt h e
R&D intensity due to the tax credit will aﬀect TFP growth through both rates of innovation
and imitation. The second eﬀect depends on a country’s distance behind the technological
frontier. We assume that TFP in the UK is 85% of the US.
Plugging in these estimates we get an implied change in TFP growth following the tax
credit of
4lnAC
it − 4lnAit =0 .034(%∆R/Y )
With an immediate increase in R&D of 0.23% this gives us an immediate increase in TFP
growth of 0.0065%. It is hard to interpret the magnitude of this number. We will show
below how it may be converted into an eﬀect of the R&D tax credit on manufacturing
value-added. The long-run eﬀect of the R&D tax credit on TFP growth is greater, as R&D
gradually responds over time to the change in its user cost.
So far we have assumed that the UK’s distance behind the technological frontier is ﬁxed.
However, the model above can also be used to solve for steady-state equilibrium levels of
relative TFP.



































where uit =+ ψi+Tt+εit. In steady-state, TFP in all non-frontier countries is an equilibrium
distance behind TFP in the frontier, such that all countries exhibit the same rate of TFP




















Where * denotes the steady-state level of all variables. In steady-state, the increase in R&D
will have no eﬀect on the non-frontier’s rate of TFP growth (unless it induces a change in
the frontier country), but it will aﬀect the steady-state level of relative TFP.
A.4 How Will Output Respond to a Change in TFP?
What is the immediate impact of an increase in TFP on levels of output? Here we use the
fact that













where Y denotes value-added in total manufacturing, and where the second and third terms
on the right hand side are assumed to be invariant to the R&D tax credit. The change in
output attributable to the R&D tax credit is
Y C






Equation (23) can be used for a cost-beneﬁt analysis of the R&D tax credit based on its
instantaneous eﬀect.

















where the second term on the right hand side is assumed to be invariant to the R&D tax
credit. If we could observe actual steady-state output without the R&D tax credit, it would































30Where we again use the fact that equation (24) must hold as an accounting identity. How-
ever, since steady-state output in the frontier is unaﬀected by the R&D tax credit, equation
(25) simpliﬁes to
lnY ∗C
i − lnY ∗
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